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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
In reply to the Brief of Respondent, Defendant Crestani 
submits the following facts to correct misstatements or supply 
omissions necessary for a full understanding of this case: 
1. In this case, Defendant Crestani was charged with 
stealing money from the commercial bank account known as MMD-2 on 
four separate occasions over a three-month period from May 7 to 
August 13, 1982. The total amount alleged to have been stolen 
was $57,300.00- (R. 23). 
2. Originally, the State alleged that the four withdrawals 
made by Crestani were unlawful because all of the money deposited 
into MMD-2 was escrow money belonging to the customers of Alta 
Title Company. (R. 23). 
3. At trial, however, substantial evidence was introduced 
establishing that MMD-2 was, from its inception, used to maintain 
funds other than escrow monies and that the account at various 
times contained personal funds of the Defendant Crestani as well 
as funds belonging to Alta Title Company. This point is conceded 
in Respondent's Brief in the first paragraph on page 4. 
4. No particular victim or rightful owner of the allegedly 
stolen funds was ever identified by the prosecution. 
(T. 198-200). 
5. MMD-2 was an active account for the lS-month period 
ending in March, 1983. The State introduced at trial the monthly 
account statements and individual checks and deposit items for 
MMD-2 for only the period February, 1982, through October, 1982. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 11 and 17 through 24). 
6. In an attempt to show that the Defendant's withdrawal 
of money caused a financial loss, the State introduced evidence 
that when MMD-2 closed in March, 1983, Alta Title's underwriter 
paid approximately $125,000.00 to $150,000.00 due to losses in 
MMD-2 (T. 57, 58). However, since no bank records were in-
troduced showing what happened to MMD2 during the five-month 
period from November, 1982, to March, 1983, no evidence was 
available at trial directly connecting four charged withdrawals 
with the losses in March, 1983. 
7. At trial, the State did not provide any audit or 
accounting of the MMD-2 account over its entire 13-month exis-
tence. The only analysis of what happened in that account 
offered in the State's case in chief was through the testimony of 
Roger Piburn, a former employee of Alta Title Company (T. 
138-163). Mr. Piburn testified that in November, 1982, he 
performed a review of deposits into and disbursements out of 
MMD-2 for the period February, 1982, through October, 1982. (T. 
144, 190). 
8. Mr. Piburn testified only from memory about his review 
conducted some five years earlier and he produced no notes, 
memoranda or records of his review of the account (T. 168). 
9. On the first day of trial, Mr. Piburn testified that he 
couldn't recall any of Defendant Crestani's personal monies being 
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in MMD-2 (T. 146, 194). The next day, Mr. Piburn testified that 
he did recall that Defendant Crestani had personal funds in MMD-2 
(T. 242). However, Mr. Piburn could not recall any specific 
deposit of Mr. Crestani1s. (T. 243). 
10. Contrary to Mr. Piburn's testimony (T. 144, 242), the 
MMD-2 account was not consistently overdrawn. In fact, the 
account was never in an overdraft status from its inception until 
the end of October (Plaintiff's Exhibits 11 and 20-24) and the 
overdraft disclosed by the October statement was in the amount of 
only $2,854.95. That is some Fifty-four Thousand Dollars 
($54,000.00) less than the alleged loss from the Crestani 
withdrawals. The records for the account show that none of the 
withdrawals charged to the Defendant caused an overdraft in the 
account. (Exhibits 20P, 21P and IIP). 
11. The record does not disclose that trial counsel made a 
Motion to Dismiss at the close of the State's case. 
12. Had trial counsel called the witness Blake Hammond from 
Phoenix to testify, Mr. Hammond would have testified that in late 
February or March, 1983, Mr. Piburn stated in front of other 
witnesses that he had not performed any reconciliation of MMD-2 
(R. 201). 
13. After sentencing in this case, in the two-week period 
between the hearings on Defendant's motion for a new trial on 
October 26, 1987 and November 12, 1987, the CPA hired by new-
counsel for Mr. Crestani performed a review of the entire MMD-2 
account as well as several other accounts maintained by Alta 
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Title Co. and Mr. Crestani. The two reports generated by the CPA 
from this review are attached hereto as Addendum Exhibits "A" and 
"B". 
14. The CPA discovered several deposits of Mr. Crestani1s 
personal funds into MMD-2 which were not known to trial counsel 
or mentioned at trial. 
15. The CPA discovered one deposit made on June 28, 1982, 
in the amount of $24,622.50. The CPA further found that these 
funds were still in the account and available to cover the 
$16,500.00 withdrawal on August 13, 1982, which was the basis of 
Count IV of the Information. Both Mr. Crestani and Raymond Fry 
have confirmed that the deposited funds were owed to Mr. Crestani 
personally. (R. 266, 252-254). 
16. In addition, the CPA located a deposit of Mr. 
Crestanifs personal funds in the amount of $50,000.00, made by 
Mr. Crestani's attorney on August 5, 1982 (Exhibit "A" at p.4). 
The CPA discovered that this deposit was intended by Mr. Crestani 
to go into MMD-2, but unknown to Mr. Crestani, was deposited into 
another account by mistake (Id.). The accountant discovered that 
these funds were never withdrawn up to the time that Alta Title 
closed in March, 1983 (Id.). 
17. The CPA also discovered that in 1982, Mr. Crestani had 
available to him in the bank accounts of Alta Title over 
$500,000.00 of personal funds from the sale of the Alta Title 
building (Exhibit "B" at p.2). The CPA further found that 
because of the numerous deposits into MMD-2 from the various Alta 
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Title bank accounts, many of which could have been part of the 
above-described $500,000 or other funds belonging to Mr, 
Crestani, a determination of whether or not other funds were 
available to cover to the withdrawals charged in this case would 
require a review of all Alta's accounts (Id.). The CPA!s report 
Because there were over $4,400,000 in depos-
its into the MMD-2 account classified as 
"repurchase agreement11 funds, and multiple 
transfers from the general Alta account and 
the MMD1 account, and many transfers from the 
MMD-2 account into the Valley Bank escrow 
account, a full and complete accounting of 
all transactions must be made before anyone 
can answer [the question of whether or not 
Crestani had funds in the MMD-2 account to 
cover the charged withdrawals] accurately. 
This has never been done. (Exhibit ffBff at 
pp.2-3. Emphasis in original). 
18. The CPA also discovered numerous deposits of Crestanifs 
personal funds into MMD-2 subsequent to the date of the last 
charged offense. The CPAfs report states that because of time 
constraints, they were not able to obtain adequate documentation 
from the other deposits to include them in his report. (Exhibit 
"A" at p.4). 
19. The CPA also found that when he showed Mr. and Mrs. 
Crestani the full records of the MMD-2 account, their memories 
were prompted with regard to the details of specific transactions 
(Exhibit MA"at p.l). The CPA reports that the Crestanis were 
able to recall events surrounding the four charged withdrawals 
which, because they did not have the documents, they were not 
able to recall at trial. (Exhibit "A" at pp.2-4). 
\.m A . T\ n / -i -7 
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20. The cash withdrawals referred to on page 7 of Respon-
dents Brief which Mr, Piburn testified Mr, Crestani made and 
"placed in his pocket" were not withdrawals from MMD-2, but were 
from the Alta Title General Fund account (T. 251). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The requisite showing of prejudice to Defendant Crestani!s 
case is made out by the evidence that trial counsel's lack of 
preparation and his incomplete factual investigation left him 
completely ignorant of facts providing a complete defense to 
count IV of the information and arguably good and sufficient 
defenses to the remaining counts. Trial counsel was unaware of 
many of the deposits of Defendant Crestani's personal monies into 
MMD-2 both before and after the charged withdrawals and he was 
further ignorant of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
deposits that were relied upon by the defense at trial. 
Trial counsel's lack of understanding of the case also 
prevented him from making a motion to dismiss which should have 
been made and probably would have been granted at the close of 
the State's case. Further, trial counsel's Ignorance caused him 
unwittingly to supply a missing element of tljie State's proof. 
Defense counsel's unprofessional conduct which deprived 
Defendant Crestani of exonerating evidence cannot be excused as 
sound trial strategy. Since trial counsel completely failed in 
his duty to carefully investigate the facts of the case, his 
tactical decisions were the result of inadequate preparation and 
therefore lacked a rational basis. 
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Trial counsel's failures to object to the admission of 
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence at trial were the result, not 
of trial strategy, but of ignorance and negligence. 
Respondent's argument that Instructions 16 and 25 were 
!fhelpfuln or "clarifying" instructions is completely refuted by a 
careful reading of both instructions. 
Notwithstanding the abandonment of the terms "general and 
specific intent11, in Utah's statutory scheme, Defendant 
Crestani's proposed intent instructions were improperly denied 
because the instructions given by the Court did not clearly 




TRIAL COUNSEL'S PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF 
THIS CASE FELL BELOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
STANDARD AND RESULTED IN SEVERE 
PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT CRESTANI'S CASE 
Against the overwhelming evidence of trial counsel's lack of 
preparation and factual investigation presented in Appellant's 
Brief, the State sets up only a few "straw man" arguments which 
simply ignore the thrust and substance of this appeal. 
Most assuredly, Defendant Crestani bases this appeal on the 
violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel secured 
by article I sections VII and XII of the Utah Constitution and by 
the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution. Meaningfully applied, that right includes the 
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opportunity to receive effective aid of counsel in the prepara-
tion and trial of the case. People v. Douglas, 61 Cal. 2d 430, 
434, 392 P.2d 964, 38 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1964); People v. Carter, 66 
Cal. 2d 666, 669, 427 P.2d 214, 58 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1967). 
According to Utah law, the threshold inquiry in a case 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is whether or not the 
conduct of trial counsel prejudiced the defendant's case. State 
v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987). The parties agree that 
prejudice is established by affirmatively showing that a reason-
able probability exists that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the trial result would have been different. State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). (Br. of Resp. p.14.) 
This standard, adopted from Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), is less restrictive than the 
"farce and sham11 standard previously used by Utah Courts (See 
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976)). Under the modern 
standard, a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient 
conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case, 
Strickland at 683, 104 S.Ct at 2067, but only the existence of a 
reasonable probability that the result would have been different. 
Respondent acknowledges that prejudice is established where 
the conduct of trial counsel "probably resulted in the forfeiture 
of a substantial defense." (Br. of Resp. p.17, quoting Common-
wealth v. Sellon, 402 N.E.2d 1329, (Mass. 1980)). 
However, Respondent baldly and incorrectly asserts that: 
"Defendant does not assert he lost a substantial defense nor that 
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'any issue of law or fact could have but was not exploited by 
counsel for the Defendant's benefits1 lf (Br, of Resp. p. 17, 
citations omitted)• 
In fact, Defendant Crestani has repeatedly and strongly 
asserted that because of trial counsel's inadequate preparation, 
he lost an absolute defense to count IV of the information. In 
addition, the true facts of Defendant's financial situation, his 
numerous deposits into MMD-2 both before and after the charged 
withdrawals, and, the true facts and circumstances surrounding 
some of the contested deposits were kept from the jury because of 
trial counsel's failure to obtain and review with Defendant and 
the other witnesses the relevant account records. 
The clearest prejudice results from trial counsel's failure 
to identify the $24,000.00 deposit of June 28, 1982. Against 
this powerful piece of evidence, Respondent can only point out 
that the CPA did not establish, as of course he could not have 
established, the personal source of the loan to Raymond Fry. 
However, Respondent ignores the evidence submitted to the trial 
court that both Defendant Crestani and Mr. Fry identified the 
loan as having come from personal funds of Defendant Crestani. 
(R. 266, 253). More importantly, however, trial counsel was 
completely ignorant of this transaction, which a thorough review 
of MMD-2 and even an adequate interrogation of his own client 
would surely have revealed. It is solely because of trial 
counsel's constitutionally inadequate preparation for trial that 
-9-
this evidence and the complete defense it would have provided was 
lost to Defendant Crestani. 
Additional evidence of trial counsel's ignorance of the case 
is found in the fact that the CPA, in going over the MMD-2 
account records with Defendant and his witnesses, was given 
reasonable explanations for the charged withdrawals that were not 
presented at trial. Contrary to the assertions of Respondent's 
Brief, this evidence is not presented here to "show that Defen-
dant lacked the requisite intent" (Br. of Resp. p.15). This 
evidence is submitted to show that adequate investigation and 
preparation would have discovered additional important evidence 
and testimony helpful to the defense that should have been heard 
by the jury. The fact that it was not severly prejudiced 
Defendant's case. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COUNSEL FURTHER PREJUDICED DEFENDANT 
CRESTANI'S CASE BY FAILING TO PERCEIVE A 
FATAL WEAKNESS IN THE STATE'S CASE. 
The legal case constructed against Defendant Crestani at 
trial was remarkably weak. The prosecution's case was originally 
based upon the flawed premise that MMD-2 was exclusively an 
escrow account. When it became clear at trial that an MMD-2 was 
also used, before and after the alleged thefts, as a depository 
for Defendant Crestani's personal funds, as well as funds of Alta 
Title over which he would have had authority, the State's case 
was left with a glaring deficiency. 
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The State's case was suddenly without any proof that the 
Defendant Crestani did not withdraw his own funds or funds he 
believed to be his own. The $2,800.00 overdraft in the account 
in October was insufficient to demonstrate the theft of 
$57,000.00, and, because of the gap in the bank record evidence 
between October 1982 and March 1983, there was no evidence to tie 
the Crestani withdrawals to the $150,000.00 loss that occurred 
when the account was closed. 
Because trial counsel was largely ignorant of the history of 
the account, he failed, at the close of the State's evidence, to 
move to dismiss the State's case for failure to prove the 
elements of lack of authority and intent to permanently deprive. 
Instead, he took on the burden of disproving that which the State 
has failed to prove in the first place by introducing evidence of 
deposits which he thought would have covered the charged 
withdrawals. 
However, because trial counsel had failed to subpoena the 
records of disbursements from MMD-2, both he and his woefully 
unprepared witnesses were unaware that the few deposits for which 
they had records had been disbursed from the account prior to the 
charged withdrawals. He also tested the jury's credulity by 
having Mrs. Crestani testify to huge deposits for which they 
could produce no records. 
Though the prosecutor was apparently also unaware of the 
deposits of Crestani's personal funds in MMD-2, he was able, 
during an overnight recess, to locate the disbursement records 
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that deprived the defense evidence of any probative force. The 
Crestani1s, unprepared as they were for this unexpected evidence, 
could offer no explanation. Then, through his questioning and in 
his closing argument, the prosecutor used this monumental defense 
error to supply the very evidence of lack of authority that was 
otherwise lacking in his own case. The prosecutor was able to 
say to the jury, in essence, if Mr. Crestani had authority to 
withdraw these funds, he and his wife would not have had to try 
to "pull the wool over" the jury's eyes by inventing bogus 
deposits or claiming deposits covered the withdrawals when they 
knew full well the deposits either did not exist or had been 
withdrawn before the thefts. 
Trial counsel's ignorance of the facts and failure of 
preparation and the devastating effect achieved by the prose-
cution in pointing out those defects to the jury can be confirmed 
by even a brief review of the record. 
After suddenly being told she would be a witness for her 
husband three days into the trial, Vicki Crestani took the stand 
and was asked immediately to confirm a deposit of Defendant 
Crestani1s personal funds into MMD-2 in the amount of $15,000.00. 
(T. 408-410). The next day, on cross examination, the prosecutor 
confronted her with the damning evidence that she herself had 
withdrawn the $15,000.00 deposit at the same time it was put into 
MMD-2. The following exchange occurred between the prosecutor 
and Mrs. Crestani: 
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Mr. Bown: So you knew that money 
was out of that account 
when you testified about 
that $15,000.00? 
Mrs. Crestani: No. I did not. 
Mr. Bown: You didn't recall that he 
told you to take the 
$15,000.00 out until just 
now? 
Mrs. Crestani: No sir, not until I was 
shown this document. 
(T. 472) 
As a further example, on direct examination, trial counsel 
tried to get Mrs. Crestani to establish, from memory without 
benefit of deposit documents, two $100,000.00 deposits into MMD-2 
(T. 419). The ineptness of this defense tactic was emphasized by 
numerous foundational objections which caused considerable 
embarrassment because Mrs. Crestani was unable to recall the 
dates of the deposits except within a general time frame of 
"mid-1982.11 (T. 419-421) 
Trial counsel then attempted to have Mrs. Crestani explain 
why no documents were available to prove the existence of the 
deposits and the following exchange occurred: 
Mr. Hansen: And were there 
documentations of these 
amounts? 
Mrs. Crestani: In these--
Mr. Hansen: Of the hundred and the 
hundred? 
Mrs. Crestani: Yes, there are documents. 
Mr. Hansen: And do you have access to 
them? 
Mrs. Crestani: No, I'm sorry, we don't. 
Mr. Hansen: Can you tell me where 
they are? 
Mrs. Crestani: I believe those are with 
attorneys, with the Alta 
Title attorneys, our 
personal attorneys. 
They are not in our 
possession. 
(T. 421, 422) 
Trial counsel did not attempt to explain to the jury why, if 
these crucial documents were in the possession of the Crestanis' 
own attorneys, they were not produced at trial. 
On cross examination, the prosecutor repeatedly asked Mrs. 
Crestani if she could find either of the $100,000.00 deposits in 
the MMD-2 bank statements. (T. 423, 424) Mrs. Crestani had to 
admit that she had not previously looked for those deposits (T. 
424). The prosecutor then pointedly highlighted the frailty of 
Mrs. Crestani's testimony: 
Mr. Bown: You don't know? 
Mrs. Crestani: But the loan document 
was for $100,000.00. 
Mr. Bown: That's all you know? 
Mrs. Crestani: I know that the loan was 
for $100,000.00. 
Mr. Bown: How long have you known 
about that loan? 
Mrs. Crestani: I knew about it when it 
was taken out. 
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Mr. Bown: You still haven't found 
that on the MMD-2? You 
can't pinpoint it to any 
specific— 
Mrs. Crestani: I have only looked 
through this particular 
one. I can look through 
these others. 
I don't see one for 
exactly $100,000.00 
deposit. 
Mr. Bown: Okay. So, you are just 
relying on your memory to 
say it went into MMD-2? 
Mrs. Crestani: No. I believe it did. 
Mr. Bown: You are relying on your 
memory? 
Mrs. Crestani: Yes. 
(T. 425) 
The prejudice to the defense case of this devastating 
sequence of trial events, caused solely by trial counsel's 
inadequate preparation, is painfully clear. 
POINT III 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURES AMOUNTED TO 
CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
AND CANNOT BE CALLED SOUND TRIAL STRATEGY. 
It is difficult to understand Respondent's argument that, 
even if prejudice was established, trial counsel's conduct can be 
dismissed as "sound trial strategy." (Br. of Resp. at p.17). 
One wonders what possible sound trial strategy would encompass a 
defense attorney's decision to withhold from the jury exonerating 
evidence. 
-15-
It is not difficult to perceive why Respondent asserts this 
argument. Tactical trial decisions are usually insulated from 
appellate Msecond guessing." Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 
(Utah App. 1987); State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 
1976). People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d 587 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 281 (1979). 
However, courts have pointed out that: 
Even tactical decisions may demonstrate incompetence 
if made without the benefit of f substantial factual 
inquiry. Frierson, supra, citing In re Saunders, 
2 Cal. 3rd 1033, 1048-1049, 472 P.2d 921, 88 Cal. Rptr. 
633 (1970). 
Respondent's Brief ignores the fact that the constitutional 
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel imposes a ,fduty on 
defense attorneys to investigate carefully all defenses of fact 
and law that may be available to the Defendant, and that this 
duty to investigate requires that counsel gather as much informa-
tion as possible about the case." Barber v. Municipal Court, 
24 Cal. 3d 742, 598 P.2d 818, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1979). 
When confronted with the claim that trial counsel's appar-
ently unprofessional conduct was "sound trial strategy", an 
appellate court must decide "whether counsel's actions were the 
result of informed judgment or constitutionally inadequate 
preparation." Stough v. State, 618 P.2d 301 (Hawaii 1980). 
Trial tactics can never be called sound when counsel fails 
to make a substantial factual inquiry into the specifics of his 
client's defense. Indeed, other courts have reversed convictions 
where trial counsel's inaction deprives him of a rational basis 
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upon which to reach informed tactical and strategic decisions. 
See People v. Frierson, supra. 
In the instant case, trial counsel failed to make the 
careful factual investigation necessary for a constitutionally 
adequate defense. He entered the trial completely ignorant of a 
large amount of factual information necessary for an understand-
ing of his client's defense. As such, he could not function as 
adequate counsel. Whatever tactical and strategic decisions he 
made were without rational basis and, by definition, wholly 
unsound. No such unprofessional conduct can meet the constitu-
tional standard of effective assistance of counsel. 
In addition, trial counsel's conduct was constitutionally 
deficient in another respect. For nearly two years trial counsel 
avoided any contact or communication with his client. Only on 
the literal eve of trial was Defendant Crestani able to discuss 
some of the factual defenses and evidence necessary to defend the 
case with trial counsel. 
A meaningful discussion with one's client of the realities 
of the client's case is as important to the concept of constitu-
tionally effective assistance of counsel as the informed evalu-
ation of potential defenses. Goodwin v. Balkom, 684 F.2d 794, 
805 (11th Cir. 1982). cert, den., 460 U.S. 1098 (1983). Gaines 
v. Hopper, 575 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (5th Cir. 1978). Adequate 
consultation between an attorney and the client is an essential 
element of competent representation of a criminal defendant. 
United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). 
-17-
While the amount of consultation required will depend on the 
facts of each case, the "consultations should be sufficient to 
determine all legally relevant information known to the Defen-
dant.ff Ld. See also, U.S. ex rel Cross v. DeRobertis, 661 F. 
Supp. 683 (N.D. 111. 1986). 
Where trial counsel's representation was so obviously 
deficient in both investigation of factual defenses and consulta-
tion with his client, there is little question that his conduct 
fell far below the constitutional standard. 
POINT IV 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO PREVENT THE 
ADMISSION OF IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL 
EVIDENCE PREJUDICED DEFENDANT'S CASE. 
In its Brief, Respondent attempts to defend the manner in 
which the civil statute, Exhibit 30-p, was received into evi-
dence. Of course, this event was but one of several raised by 
Defendant Crestani to illustrate trial counsel's ineffectiveness 
caused by lack of preparation and lack of understanding of the 
case. 
On the last day of trial, trial counsel recalled witness 
Gary Carlson apparently for the sole purpose of establishing that 
out-of-state partnerships had to have individuals rather than 
corporations as their registered agents and therefore, Mr. 
Crestani and not Alta Title was necessarily the recipient of the 
$50.00 partnership fees. (T. 491-495). Trial counsel himself was 
apparently confused about the difference between Mr. Crestanifs 
-18-
status as a title insurance agent and agent for the partnerships. 
In his effort to clarify the point he picked up Exhibit 30-p, 
which had not been admitted, and began questioning Mr. Carlson 
about the statute for the sole purpose of showing that it did not 
apply in the case. The Court, and not trial counsel, insisted 
that the statute be admitted if trial counsel were going to 
question the witness about it. Trial counsel attempted to limit 
the purpose for which the civil statute was admitted but the 
Court denied his motion. (T. 493). 
Later, counsel tried to object because the civil statute in 
question did not relate to Mr. Crestanifs partnership agency. 
The following exchange occurred: 
Mr. Hansen: I object to that because 
it refers to this statute 
which is not the 
partnership act that we 
are talking about with 
Mr. Crestani. This is 





The fact remains that 
Mrs. Crestani testified 
that Mr. Crestani is a 
title insurance agent. 
Well, that's true. But 
the evidence as to the 
$50.00 that were— 
We're talking about the 
dealings of an agent. 




Shortly thereafter Mr. Bown began questioning Mr. Carlson 
about the requirement in the civil statute that interest earned 
on trust account monies be paid to the customer and not the 
agency. (T. 496, 497). This line of questioning, allowed by the 
Court presumably because the civil statute was in evidence, was 
reemphasized in Mr. Bown's closing argument and in Instruction 
No. 16. This highly irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, which 
had nothing to do with the theft charges, ought to have been 
excluded. Trial counsel, in fact, never objected to any of the 
misappropriation of interest evidence. Defendant Crestani 
submits that this was not the result of trial strategy but 
negligence. 
POINT V 
THE GIVING OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 16 AND 25 WAS 
MISLEADING, PREJUDICIAL AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 
In its Brief, Respondent defends both jury instructions 16 
and 25 on the ground that they were ffrelevant to prove the 
element of unauthorized control.ff (Br. of Resp. at p.26) Aside 
from the fact that jury instructions are not proof and a 
relevance standard does not apply, these two challenged in-
structions were improper because they do not correctly state the 
law applicable to the evidence received at trial. 
Part of Instruction No. 16, the verbatim selected portions 
of the civil statute referred to above, would have been proper 
under the prosecution1 s original theory of the case. Had the 
money in MMD-2 been only escrow monies, the first paragraph of 
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Instruction 16 would have been proper to define the restrictions 
on Defendant Crestanifs use of those monies. But because MMD-2 
was shown to contain Defendant Crestanifs own money and Defendant 
Crestani did not claim that he had any authority to use escrowed 
funds, Instruction No. 16 became irrelevant to the case. 
Even if, for the purposes of argument, the first paragraph 
of Instruction No. 16 could be considered proper to emphasize a 
lack of authority that Defendant Crestani never asserted he had, 
the second paragraph dealing with the restrictions on the use of 
interest from the account was absolutely prejudicial and 
irrelevant. Interestingly, the second paragraph of Instruction 
No. 16 was selectively lifted from among the other provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-25-26 (Supp. 1985), repealed by Utah Laws, 
Ch. 242, § 58. It is clear that this paragraph was inserted in 
the instruction solely for the improper purpose of emphasizing 
uncharged civil misconduct in order to portray the Defendant in a 
bad light. 
Instruction No. 25 and the disturbing interaction between 
these two improper and unlawful instructions is fully addressed 
in Appellant's Brief. Respondent's argument that Instruction No. 
25 was properly given to "clarify11 anything (Br. of Resp. at p. 
27) is simply not supported by a careful reading of this extreme-
ly misleading instruction. 
The use of these instructions at trial provides a separate 




THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
The State, in its Brief at Page 28 cites State v. Calamity, 
735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1987)- The portion of that case cited by 
the State simply holds that the terms "general and specific 
intent" are no longer used in our statutory scheme and therefore, 
instructions on the mental state required $hould be drawn to 
enlighten the jury as to requirements of the current statute and 
need not use the terms "general" or "specific" intent as terms of 
art. Nothing more was stated or implied by the statement quoted 
by Respondent. The Court in Calamity went on to identify the 
required mental state for the crime and stated: 
The trial court instructed the jury that 
defendant could not be convicted unless he 
acted intentionally or with knowledge. The 
court then defined 'intentionally1 and 
'knowingly.' 
What is sought in the instant case is merely the same 
thoroughness of instruction required in Calamity. 
The holding that instructions need not be couched in terms 
of "general" or "specific" intent does not change the requirement 
that the jury must be properly instructed on all of the elements 
of the crime. The instruction given as number 14 cited by the 
State contains the statutory elements defining purpose to de-
prive, but it does nothing to alert the jury that this is a 
separate element of the crime. 
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Defendant's offered instructions merely state the necessity 
of finding the required mental state as a separate element. The 
instructions given did not do this adequately and were therefore 
inadequate to ensure that the jury was fully informed of the 
requirement of adequate proof of mens rea. 
Defendant's case depended partly upon his assertion that he 
did not withdraw any funds with "purpose to deprive" any rightful 
owner thereof. Therefore, the Defendant's theory of the case was 
not adequately presented to the jury by the instructions given. 
"A defendant is entitled to have a jury instructed on his theory 
of the case, if there be any substantial evidence to justify 
giving the instruction." State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 
P.2d 618 (1969); Accord State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1252 
(Utah 1984). In the instant case not only was defendant's theory 
of the case not properly presented, but the jury was not properly 
instructed as to all the elements of the offense. "An accurate 
instruction on the basic elements of the offense charged is 
essential, and failure to so instruct constitutes reversible 
error." State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent's Brief addresses only a selected few of the 
numerous factual and legal issues raised and substantiated in 
this appeal. Even in those few issues. Defendant Crestani's 
position is misstated or truncated. The true facts of this case 
establish overwhelmingly the constitutionally ineffective nature 
of trial counsel's representation. 
The deficiencies of representation described here are so 
glaring that one could conclude that the trial was reduced to a 
Mfarce and a sham11, thus meeting even the more restrictive 
standard of prior case law justifying a reversal of the 
conviction. There is no doubt that these deficiencies undermine 
any confidence in the justness of the verdicts. 
Having been deprived of his right to counsel vouchsafed by 
the constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States, 
Defendant Crestani is entitled to a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED this ^ / ^ d a y of September, 1988 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
James V. Crestani 
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CEHTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
UTAH ASSOCIATION OF 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
PRIVATE COMPANIES 
PRACTICE SECTION 
SEC PRACTICE SECTION 
November 11, 1987 
Mr. John F. Clark 
Attorney at Law 
Sessions & Moore 
300 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: James V. CrestanI 
Dear John: 
You have requested that we analyze certain records of James V. 
Crestani (hereinafter CrestanI) and Alta Title Company 
(hereinafter Alta) to determine If there were funds in the 
Alta MMD2 account which were, or CrestanI had reason to 
believe were, CrestanI*s funds at or about the time funds were 
withdrawn which Crestani was charged with theft for. 
We reviewed all files In the Prosecutor's office, the evidence 
files at the Clerk's office, files at Main Hurdman's office 
and files at attorneys for the underwriter's office. We also 
received certain documentation In the form of microfilm copies 
of checks, drafts and deposits of the MMD2 account from Sandy 
State Bank. We interviewed James V. Crestani, Vickie R. 
(Peterson) Crestani (hereinafter Vickie), Ray D. Fry, Dick 
Romono, a private Investigator, and James A. Mclntyre, 
attorney for CrestanI, regarding various documents and 
chronology of events, while at the same time presenting them 
with copies of documents and dates, in this case. We also 
discussed scope of audits, accounting detail and other matters 
with prosecutors, accountants with Main Hurdman, attorneys and 
certain customers of Alta. We have relied upon these 
conversations and Information which they gave us In arriving 
at our conclusions. 
When presented with specific documentation and correlated 
chronology, Crestani's memory seemed to be prompted with 
regard to the sequence of events and details of transactions 
In this matter. We will detail events and documentation in 
relationship to each of the four (4) counts of theft. 
John F. Clark 
James V. CrestanI matter 






We will address each count separately so as to show specific 
funds which CrestanI believed were on deposit In the MMD2 
account at the time of the respective Withdrawals to show, 
where applicable, specific correlations and/or cumulative 
funds which CrestanI could have believed he was withdrawing. 
Count 1: 
On March 30, 1982, CrestanI deposited $15,000.00 into the MMD2 
account (see Exhibit 1). The money originated from life 
insurance proceeds upon his mother's death. The $15,000.00 
was withdrawn from MMD2 account on the same day by draft 
signed by Vickie R. Peterson and transferred to an Alta 
account at Valley Bank & Trust Co.(Valley Bank)(see Exhibit 
1A). Vickie indicates Roger Piburn (Piburn) directed her to 
withdraw the funds; CrestanI maintains he did not know the 
funds were withdrawn. 
On April 14, 1982, CrestanI deposited $19,896.73 Into the MMD2 
account (see Exhibit 2). The money originated from CrestanI's 
account at Merrill Lynch. CrestanI maintains he called Ron 
Carnego, President of Sandy State Bank, and asked him how much 
he had to deposit for 30 days to receive $20,000.00 at 
Interest and that Is the amount he deposited for that purpose. 
The $19,896.73 was withdrawn from MMD2 account on the same day 
by draft signed by Vickie R. Peterson and transferred to an 
Alta account at Valley Bank (see Exhibit 2A). Vickie 
indicates Piburn directed her to withdraw the funds; CrestanI 
maintains he did not know the funds were withdrawn. 
This reflects $34,896.73 was deposited into the MMD2 account 
by or for CrestanI prior to the May 7, 1982 disbursement of 
$4,000 (Count 1) which CrestanI maintains he thought was still 
In the account on May 7, 1982. The entire $34,896.73 had been 
withdrawn and transferred to an Alta account at Valley Bank by 
that date. 
Count 2: 
The April 14, 1982, deposit referred to above of $19,896.73 
(see Exhibit 2) was deposited Into MMD2 account by Crestani to 
draw interest for one month. As of May 19, 1982, according to 
Crestani 's recollection of his conversation with Ron Carnego, 





of theft were as follows 
May 7, 1982 
May 19, 1982 
June 11, 1982 
August 13, 1982 
John F. Clark 
James V. CrestanI matter 
November 11, 1987 
It would have accumulated both principal and Interest of 
$20,000.00 (had it not been withdrawn) by May 19, 1982. 
On May 4, 1982, Sandy State Bank credited $1,306.25 Into the 
MMD2 account (see Exhibit 3) for interest earned for the month 
of April, 1982. This Is noted to show that interest was 
credited to the account and would have accrued on the 
$19,896.73, had It not been withdrawn. 
On June 7, 1982, Sandy State Bank credited $402.52 into the 
MMD2 account (see Exhibit 4) for interest earned for the month 
of May, 1982. This is noted for the same reason Indicated 
above. 
This reflects $34,896.73 was deposited Into the MMD2 account 
(not including the Interest) by or for CrestanI prior to the 
May 7, 1982 disbursement of $4,000.00 (Count 1) and May 19, 
1982 disbursement of $20,000.00 (Count 2). The entire 
$34,896.73 had been withdrawn and transferred to an Alta 
account at Valley Bank by that date. 
Count 3: 
On June 4, 1982, Sandy State Bank credited $17,082.00 Into the 
MMD2 account (see Exhibit 5) by mistake. The funds originated 
from a personal loan CrestanI had made at Sandy State Bank 
against a boat and should have been deposited into CrestanI's 
personal account at Sandy State Bank. When the bank called 
CrestanI on June 11, 1982 to advise him his personal account 
was overdrawn, he advised them of the deposit from the loan, 
they discovered the error, and he stopped by the bank to sign 
a "counter check" to transfer the funds to his personal 
account, taking $800.00 of cash from the funds and depositing 
$16,000.00 into his personal account. On June 10, 1982, (the 
day before) the $17,082.00 was withdrawn from MMD2 by draft 
signed by Vickie R. Peterson and transferred to an Alta 
account at Valley Bank (see Exhibit 5A). Vickie Indicates 
PIburn directed her to withdraw the funds; CrestanI maintains 
he did not know the funds were withdrawn. 
This reflects that $51,978.73 was deposited Into the MMD2 
account (not including Interest) by or for CrestanI prior to 
the Counts 1, 2 and 3 disbursements totalling $40,800.00 as of 
June 11, 1982. The entire $51,978.73 had been withdrawn and 
transferred to an Alta account at Valley Bank by that date. 
Count 4: 
On June 24, 1982, James A. Mclntyre, attorney for CrestanI, 
deposited $30,000.00 Into the MMD2 account for Crestani (see 
Exhibit 6). The funds originated from CrestanI's trust 
John F. Clark 
James V. Crestanl matter 
November 11, 1987 
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account with Mclntyre's firm. 
On June 28, 1982, Crestanl deposited $24,622.50 into the MMD2 
account (see Exhibit 7). The funds originated from a loan 
repayment from Ray D. Fry to Crestanl of $24,000.00 plus 
Interest. 
We found no records to indicate the above two deposits 
totalling $54,622.50 were ever withdrawn from the MMD2 
account, except for the $16,500 withdrawal on August 13, 1982 
(Count 4) up to and Including the time In March, 1983 when 
Alta closed. 
Other deposits: 
On August 5, 1982, James A. Mclntyre, attorney for Crestanl, 
deposited $50,000.00 for Crestanl into what Mclntyre described 
as the "escrow" account at Sandy State Bank (see Exhibit 10). 
It should have been deposited into MMD2 per Crestanl#s 
instructions to Mclntyre, but was deposited to "Alta Title 
Company Contract Servicing Account" instead. We found no 
records to Indicate the. above deposit of $50,000.00 was ever 
withdrawn from Alta up to and including the time in March, 
1983 when Alta closed. 
Although we discovered other deposits made Into Alta by 
Crestanl subsequent to the above transactions, they have not 
been included herein because we were not able, because of time 
restraints, to obtain adequate documentation for inclusion 
here!n. 
The above information reflects that $106,601.23 was deposited 
into the MMD2 account (not including interest) by or for 
Crestanl which were, or Crestanl had reason to believe were, 
Crestanl's funds at or about the time funds were withdrawn 
which Crestanl was charged with theft for. Counts 1, 2, 3 and 
4 totalled $57,300.00 as of August 13, 1982. In addition, the 
$50,000.00 deposit on August 5, 1982 should have been 
deposited Into MMD2 for Crestanl, the two amounts totalling 
$156,601.23. Three withdrawals totalling $51,978.73 were made 
and transferred to an Alta account at VaMey Bank which 
Crestanl maintains he did not know about. In addition, 
Crestanl made two withdrawals totalling $33,300.00. The 
combined withdrawals total $85,278.73. 
This leaves a balance of $21,322.50 In the MMD2 account which 
was apparently not withdrawn (not Including Interest) and a 
balance of $71,322.50, including the $50,000.00 deposit of 
August 5, 1982, which went Into an Alta account at Sandy State 
Bank . 
John F. Clark 5 
James V. Crestanl matter 
November 11, 1987 
We are available to review this information. 
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***** SUMMARY OF VISA CARD ACTIVITY ***** 
DATE DESCRIPTION LOCATION TRANSACTION DATE AMOUNT 
04 21 POLO/RALPH LAUREN 
TOTAL VISA CARD ACTIVITY 
SLC UT 04/15 9668.1 
•668.8 
***** SUMMARY OF CHECKINO ACTIVITY ***** 
DATE CHECK HUMBER PAYEE DATE WRITTEN AMOUNT 
04 19 101 ALTA TITLE CO 
TOTAL CHECKINO ACCOUNT ACTIVITY 
04/14 •19896.7 
$19896.7 
1 - YOUR ACCOUNT HAS AVAILABLE CREDIT OF- #6020 LESS ANY PENDING AUTHORIZATIONS FOR PURCHASES OR CHECKS WHIjCH HAVE HOT 
CLEARED. ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING YOUR AVAILABLE CREDIT, CREDIT CARD AND CHECK ACTIVITY SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE 
FOLLOWING TOLL FREE HUMBER< NEW YORK STATE 800-522-5510, ALASKA AND HAWAII 800-221-8802, ALL OTHER STATES 800-221-4 
IF YOUR CARD IS LOST OR STOLEN, PLEASE CALL US COLLECT IMMEDIATELY ON OUR 24 HOUR HOT LINE' 614-895-42/12. 
WHAT CRITERIA SHOULD YOU BE USING NOW TO SELECT STOCKS? FOR THE ANSWER, 
READ YOUR ENCLOSURE; YOU'LL ALSO LEARN ABOUT TWO NEW SPECIAL INVESTMENTS. 
ISE RETAIN THIS STATEMENT TO ENABLE YOU TO COMPUTE ANY INTEREST ON YOUR HEJfT STATEMENT. 
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PAGE NC. 0M2C 
07/08/82 
flLTfl TITLE - MMDc ACCOUNT SUMMARY BY ESCROW NUMBER 
REC* ST* TYPE DATE CK# PAYEE AMOUNT CLD 
* ESCROW # FLINT 
£700 13 DP 820602 0 FLINT/IVY TERRACE 
2848 13 CK 820603 1013 ALTA TRANS V.B. 




* ESCROW # FOXFIR 
1£0T 6 CK 
1369 6 DM 
1404 6 DP 
1420 6 DP 





4017 WESTERN STATES TITLE 
0 RETURNED CHECK 
0 FOXFIRE LOTS 



















** SUBTOTAL ** 
• ESCROW • FRY 
2 0 7 3 ^ * 1 DP 
SUBTOTAL 
0 FRIEDLAND/COHEN/RICH 
1028 ALTA TITLE COMPANY 
1029 ALTfl TITLE COMPANY 
1037 flLTfl TITLE COMPANY 
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24622.53 829701 
24622.59 
* ESCROW * GARDEN 
758 4 CK 820922 
759 4 CK 820923 
851 4 DP 820923 
*# SUBTOTAL ** 
1771 WESTERN FLOORING 
1772 ALTA TITLE COMPANY 
0 6ARDEN TOWERS 
• ESCROW # GflTSBY 
—aaft •^_£TCK 830110, 
** SUBTOTAL •* 








» ESCROW # GB2043 
202S 10 DP 630321 
* * SUBTOTAL * * 
0 WESTRA/CARNELL 30 .00 830321 • 
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November 16, 1987 
Mr. John F. Clark, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
Sessions & Moore 
300 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: James V, Crestanl - Supplemental Report 
Dear John: 
e/e-fr-"*7'* 
This supplements our report of November 11, 1987, 
November 11, 1987 report was Issued we found 
for the June 24, 1982 deposit in the amount of 
These funds were disbursed out of the MMD2 
account at or about the time of the deposit and were therefore 
not on deposit at the time of the August 13, 1987 disbursement 




In the November 11, 1987 report, page 4, next to last 
paragraph, next to last sentence, reads as follows; "Three 
wtlhdrawals totalling $51,978.73 were made and transferred to 
an Alta account at Valley Bank which Crestanl maintains he did 
not know about" (emphasis by undersigned). We wish to clarify 
that Crestanl knew about the Valley Bank account; maintains he 
did not know about the three withdrawals referred to. 
Also subsequent to our November 11 1987 report we found 
additional evidence that Crestanl had funds which were 
deposited into Alta accounts upon which Crestanl would have 
been able to draw which were totally unrelated to any 
"escrowed funds" belonging to customers or depositors of Alta, 
as foI lows: 
In September, 1981, Crestanl sold the Alta Title Building 
located on the corner of 200 West Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The sales price was $1,350,000.00 with a 
$350,000.00 down payment; the mortgage of approximately 
$750,000.00 was paid off by the buyer, and the balance of 
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approximately $250,000.00 was due In monthly payments with a 
balloon payment In September, 1982. After commissions and 
other selling costs, the net cash to CrestanI In September, 
1981 was approximately $300,000.00, which, according to 
CrestanI was deposited Into Alta or Into Mclntyre's trust 
account for CrestanI's benefit. According to CrestanI the 
balloon payment due In September, 1982 was also deposited Into 
Alta or Mclntyre's trust account for CrestanI's benefit. This 
would have resulted In over $500,000.00 of funds being 
available to CrestanI which did not originate from MMD2 or any 
other "escrowed funds" at Alta. 
On September 28, 1982, CrestanI deposited $8,865.43 Into the 
MMD2 account. According to CrestanI the funds originated from 
a loan repayment from Ray D. Fry to CrestanI out of the 5300 
South Partnership closing. 
Because of time constraints we were unable to verify all of 
the above Information, however our search for and of the Alta 
records continues. 
We believe that our reports contradict the Prosecution's 
position that "there is no real evidence that the money did 
not come out of the MMD2 account and the money was merely 
being replaced Into the original account", so far as the 
$24,622.50 deposit of June 28, 1982 and the $8,865,43 deposit 
of September 28, 1982 are concerned. The funds derived from 
the sale of the Alta Title Building were also obviously not 
those of customers or depositors of Alta. 
The above Information, as It supplements our report of 
November 11, 1987, reflects that CrestanI had deposited funds 
Into MMD2 account in excess of the funds withdrawn (Counts 1 
through 4) Including the September 28, 1982 deposit of 
$8,865.43. The $50,000.00 deposit of August 5, 1982, and over 
$500,000.00 In proceeds from the Building sale were additional 
funds available to CrestanI. 
As to the question asked us as to "whether or not there were 
funds In the Alta MMD2 account which were, or CrestanI had 
reason to believe were, CrestanI's funds at or about the time 
funds were withdrawn which CrestanI was charged with theft 
for", we advise you and the Court that no one can answer that 
question accurately at this time. Because there were over 
$4,400,000.00 In deposits Into the MMD2 account classified as 
"repurchase agreement" funds, and multiple transfers from the 
general Alta account and the MMD1 account, and many transfers 
from the MMD2 account into the Valley Bank escrow account, a 
full and complete accounting of a I\ transactions must be made 
before anyone can answer this question accurately. This has 
Mr. John F. Clark, r 
James V. Crestani'^ *G 
November 16, 1987 °u&0i 
never been done! 
SIncerely, 
MARTINEAU & COMPANY 
A. MartIneau,\CPA 
ling Partner 
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